mirror of
https://github.com/brunopostle/ifcurl.git
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Bruno Postle
275e74cce8
Use CacheDirectory=ifcurl (systemd creates /var/cache/ifcurl owned by the service user) and XDG_CACHE_HOME=/var/cache so platformdirs resolves to that path. Remove the /root/.cache/ifcurl ReadWritePaths entry which was inaccessible to the unprivileged ifcurl user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
70 lines
2.5 KiB
Desktop File
70 lines
2.5 KiB
Desktop File
[Unit]
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Description=ifcurl preview service
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Documentation=https://github.com/brunopostle/ifcurl
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After=network.target
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[Service]
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Type=simple
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User=ifcurl
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Group=ifcurl
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EnvironmentFile=-/etc/ifcurl/env
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ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/ifcurl serve \
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--host 127.0.0.1 \
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--port 8000 \
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--allowed-hosts git.example.com
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=5
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# Cache configuration — override in /etc/ifcurl/env:
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# IFCURL_CACHE_MAX_GB=10 max bare-repo disk cache
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# IFCURL_T2_MAX=8 max IFC blobs in memory
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# IFCURL_T3_MAX=64 max selector results in memory
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# IFCURL_SANDBOX_TIMEOUT=120 max seconds per render subprocess
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# IFCURL_SANDBOX_MEMORY_MB=0 address-space cap per subprocess (0=unlimited)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Sandbox hardening
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#
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# These directives apply to the service process and all child processes
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# (including the render subprocesses spawned by sandbox.py). Together they
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# limit the blast radius if a crafted IFC file achieves code execution inside
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# a render subprocess.
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#
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# ProtectSystem=strict + ReadWritePaths: the service can only write to its own
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# cache directory; the Forgejo data tree (/var/lib/forgejo, /etc/forgejo) is
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# read-only from this unit's perspective.
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#
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# NoNewPrivileges + RestrictSUIDSGID: prevent privilege escalation via
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# setuid binaries or capabilities.
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#
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# SystemCallFilter: allow the syscalls a Python/C-extension process needs
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# (@system-service covers the common POSIX set; @process covers fork/clone
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# which ifcopenshell's geometry iterator requires). execve/execveat are NOT
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# in either set, so an attacker with code execution cannot exec a shell.
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# The filter applies to child processes too (inherited across fork).
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#
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# RestrictAddressFamilies: the service only needs TCP/UDP to reach git hosts.
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# AF_UNIX is excluded so a compromised subprocess cannot connect to the
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# Forgejo Unix socket if one is present.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Environment=XDG_CACHE_HOME=/var/cache
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CacheDirectory=ifcurl
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NoNewPrivileges=yes
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
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PrivateTmp=yes
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ProtectSystem=strict
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ProtectHome=yes
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ReadWritePaths=/var/cache/ifcurl
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ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
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ProtectControlGroups=yes
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RestrictNamespaces=yes
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LockPersonality=yes
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RestrictRealtime=yes
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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SystemCallFilter=@system-service @process @files @io-event @network-io
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SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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